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█ Abstract In his work on attitudes de se, James Higginbotham has observed that the silent subject of the 
infinitival complements of verbs such as remember and imagine is (i) unambiguously de se and (ii) immune 
to error through misidentification relatively to the subject of the matrix clause. In this article, we review 
and criticize Higginbotham’s reflexive analysis of these infinitival complements. We also show that the 
type of criticism we raise against Higginbotham’s account applies likewise to analyses based on the use of 
acquaintance relations and centered possible worlds. Finally, following recent ideas in cognitive science, 
we propose an amendment to Higginbotham’s account based on the idea that the thematic-role “Expe-
riencer” corresponds to a function mapping events into “minimal selves”, in the sense of Shaun Gallagher.  
PAROLE CHIAVE: Attitudes de se; Immunity to Error Through Misidentification; Control; Thematic Roles; 
Minimal Self; Self-reference 
 
█ Riassunto Controllo, Attitudini de se e immunità da errore per misidentificazione – Nel suo lavoro sugli 
atteggiamenti proposizionali de se, James Higginbotham ha osservato che il soggetto nullo dei comple-
menti infinitivi di verbi come ricordare e immaginare è (i) necessariamente de se e (ii) immune da errore 
per misidentificazione da parte del soggetto della frase principale. In questo articolo, presentiamo un 
sommario critico dell’analisi riflessiva che Higginbotham propone per questa classe di complementi infini-
tivi. Dimostriamo, inoltre, che le critiche sollevate contro l’approccio di Higginbotham si applicano con 
uguale forza alle analisi basate sull’uso di relazioni di acquaintance. Nella parte conclusiva dell’articolo, 
proponiamo di modificare l’analisi di Higginbotham sulla base di alcune recenti proposte nell’ambito del-
le neuroscienze. In particolare, proponiamo che il ruolo tematico di Esperiente corrisponda a una funzio-
ne da eventi a minimal selves, nel senso discusso da Shaun Gallagher. 
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█ De re and de se reports 
 
A DE RE REPORT IS a report of an attitude 
(or speech act) that an agent has (or has ma-
de) about a certain res, individual or object: 
 
(1) a. Ralph believes that the man over there is a spy 
 b. Janet said that Arthur lives in London 
 c. Roberta thinks she looks beautiful 
 
Some de re reports can be about the agent of 
the attitude (or author of the speech) herself. 
For example, (1c) reports an attitude that 
Roberta has about herself, at least under the 
interpretation where she refers to Roberta.  
Some, but not all, de re reports where the 
res is the agent herself are also de se reports 
(the term de se was originally introduced by 
Lewis).1 A de se report is a report of an atti-
tude that an agent has about herself being 
fully aware that the res she is having an atti-
tude about is herself. It is possible to 
construct scenarios where an agent has an 
attitude about herself without knowing that 
the res she is having an attitude about is she 
herself. Various scenarios of this type have 
been presented in the literature.2  
For example, imagine that Roberta sees a 
woman on the other side of the room and  
expresses the thought that the woman is 
beautiful. Imagine also that the woman 
Roberta is referring to is Roberta herself,   
reflected in a mirror. An external observer 
informed of the fact that the woman Roberta 
is referring to is Roberta herself can report 
Roberta’s thought by uttering (1c).  
In this case, (1c) reports a thought that 
Roberta has about herself in a context in 
which Roberta is not aware of the identity 
between herself and the object of her attitu-
de. Notice, in fact, that in this context Ro-
berta would not agree to express her belief by 
means of a first-person statement such as       
“I look beautiful”. 
A de se report is a report of an attitude 
that an agent has about herself being fully 
aware of the identity between herself and the 
object of her attitude. If Roberta has a de se 
belief that she looks  beautiful,  she  would 
agree to express her belief with a first-person 
statement such as “I look beautiful”. Natural 
languages display several means for unam-
biguously  reporting a de se  attitude  or spe-
ech. Contrast (1c) with (2).  
 
(2) Roberta thinks she herself looks beautiful 
 
(1c) is compatible both with a scenario 
where Roberta is not aware of the identity 
between herself and the object of her 
thought and with a scenario in which she 
is aware of such identity. In other words, 
(1c) only contributes information about a 
property that Roberta assigns to a certain 
res which turns out to be herself, leaving 
unspecified the way in which Roberta 
identifies that res.  
 
 On the other hand, (2) is only compatible 
with a scenario in which Roberta is aware of 
the identity between the res and herself. That 
is, (2) is judged as false in the scenario where 
she thinks that the woman at the other end 
of the room is beautiful without realizing 




In this article we discuss another case of a 
grammatical structure that is unambiguously 
de se: control complements. Chierchia4 ob-
served that control complements are always 
interpreted de se: 
 
(3) a. Roberta  pensa  di essere  bella 
  Roberta  thinks  to be   beautiful 
 b. Gianni   ha  detto di essere intelligente 
  Gianni  has  said  to be  intelligent 
 c. John   expect   to  win   the race  
 
The Italian sentences (3a) and (3b) un-
ambiguously report a first-personal thought 
or speech of the type “I am beautiful” or “I 
am intelligent”. Similarly, (3c) unambiguous-
ly expresses John’s expectation that he him-
self will win the race.  
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By looking at the interpretive properties 
of the gerundive complement of the verbs 
remember and imagine (and, although in less 
detail, of want), Higginbotham5 argues for 
the stronger claim that the subject of 
(certain) control structures is not only nec-
essarily de se, but also immune to error 
through misidentification, in the sense of  
Shoemaker6 and Pryor,7 which we will discuss 
below. For the time being, we notice, follow-
ing Higginbotham, some interpretive pro-
perties of the gerundive complements of the 
verb remember.  
Both (4a) and (4b) are unambiguously de 
se  in  that  they  report  a  memory  that  
Ralph has about himself, in full awareness of 
the identity between himself and the object 
of his memory (for convenience sake, but not 
necessarily as a matter of theoretical choice, 
we follow Higginbotham in representing 
control structures as having an unpro-
nounced subject PRO, as proposed by 
Chomsky).8 
 
(4) a. Ralph remembers PRO going to the movies 
 b. Ralph remembers himself going to the movies 
 
There is, nevertheless, a sense in which 
(4a) is more “first-personal” than (4b). As 
discussed by Fodor,9 (5c) follows naturally 
from (5a-b),  whereas (5d) does not. The 
facts that only Churchill gave the speech and 
that he remembers  doing so,  do  not  sup-
port the conclusion that only Churchill re-
members himself giving the speech. It could 
in fact be the case that someone else remem-
bers Churchill giving the speech. However, 
the same premises support the conclusion 
(5c).  
 
(5) a. Only Churchill gave the speech 
 b. Churchill remembers PRO giving the speech 
 c. Only Churchill remembers PRO giving the speech 
 d. Only Churchill remembers himself giving the speech 
  
Higginbotham further notices that the ge-
rundive complement of remember contrasts 
with its finite complement in that it has an 
event-like interpretation, rather than a 
proposition-like interpretation. Suppose that 
my grandfather died before I was born. In 
this scenario, I can remember that my grand-
father was called “Rufus” but I cannot re-
member my grandfather being called 
“Rufus”. That is, (6b) may be true in the 
given scenario, but (6a) is inevitably false.  
 
(6) a. I remember my grandfather being called “Rufus”  
 b. I remember that my grandfather was called “Rufus” 
 
Accordingly, whereas (7a) is perfectly ac-
ceptable, (7b) is contradictory in a way that is 
reminiscent of the “Moore Paradox”.  
 
(7) a. I used to remember PRO walking to school in the 
5th grade, but I no longer remember it. 
 b. I used to remember that I walked to school in the  
  5th grade, but I no longer remember it. 
 
Intuitively, the crucial property of the 
control complement of remember seems to be 
that it reports the remembered event as “ex-
perienced” by the subject or, as suggested by 
Pryor,10 “from the inside”, that is, from the 
introspective, first-personal point of view of 
the bearer of the memory. When I remember 
going to the movies or walking to school, I 
remember the experiences of going to the 
movies or walking to school.11 This intuition 
extends to the control complement of       
imagine.  
 
(8) a. I imagined PRO flying through space 
 b. I imagined myself flying through space 
 
Both sentences are de se, in that the sub-
ject must be aware that the object of his  
imagination is he himself. However, (8b) do-
es not specify whether I am imagining an ob-
ject, which I identify with myself, flying 
through space or whether I am imagining the 
subjective experience of flying. The comple-
ment of (8a), on the other hand, unambi-
guously refers to the subjective experience of 
flying through space. 
Higginbotham   reports   a   similar    com- 
Control, Attitudes de se and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification 
 
187 
ment,  attributed  to  Michael  Martin,  about 
the control complement of want:  
 
There is […] a difference in the intentions 
I may have when I intend to stop smoking 
(i.e., PRO to stop smoking), and when I 
intend merely that I should stop smoking. 
The latter intention might be fulfilled, 
say, by paying someone forcibly to remo-
ve cigarettes from my person whenever I 
am caught with them; but that is not ful-
fillment of an intention to stop smoking, 
which can only be done through willful 
refusal to put a cigarette to my lips and 
light up.12 
  
We believe that something on the same 
lines can be said also for the control comple-
ment of Italian pensare (En. “Think”). Sup-
pose I have to recognize people in pictures 
that are shown to me. If I recognize the man 
in the picture as myself, I could utter (9a), 
but not (9b). The intuitive reason is, again, 
that (9b) unambiguously expresses an intro-
spective perspective according to which the 
object of the thinking is the “from the inside” 
experience of flying. 
 
(9) a. In  questa foto, penso   che  sto  volando 
  In this  picture,  think-1p that am-1p flying 
 b. In questa foto, penso  PRO di       volare 
  In  this  picture, think-1p PRO to         fly 
 
 As anticipated, Higginbotham argues that 
the central feature of control complements of 
remember and imagine is that they are im-
mune to error through misidentification. In 
the next section, we introduce briefly the 
concept of immunity to error through misi-
dentifi-cation. 
 
█ Immunity to error through  
misidentification 
 
Wittgenstein13 distinguishes two uses of 
the first-person pronoun: a use as subject, 
exemplified in (10a), and a use as object, 
exemplified in (10b).  
(10)a. I am in pain 
 b. I have a bump on my forehead 
 
The use of I as subject is immune to  error 
through misidentification. Consider the    
statement Janet is in pain. There are several 
grounds on which this statement can be chal-
lenged. Among other things, someone may 
erroneously make the statement Janet is in 
pain because she has mistakenly identified 
Janet as the person that is in pain when, in 
reality, it is someone else who is in pain. 
Consider now (10a). The author of the 
statement may be wrong in that it is not pain 
what she is feeling. However, she cannot be 
wrong that it is she herself who is in pain. As 
Wittgenstein puts it, «there is no question of 
recognizing a person when I say I have 
toothache. To ask “are you sure it is you who 
has pain?” would be nonsensical».14 
The use of I as object is not immune to er-
ror through misidentification. In the case of 
(10b),  for example,  one could conceive of 
situations in which he knew that someone 
had a bump in his head, and legitimately 
wonders whether the one having a bump in 
his head was he himself. 
Shoemaker15 suggests that the uses of the 
first-person pronoun as subject are immune 
to error through misidentification because in 
those cases the access to the self is immediate 
and non-observational, in the sense that it 
does not involve a perceptual or reflective act 
of consciousness. We will elaborate on this 
point later in the article. Notice, for the time 
being, that Shoemaker’s observation captures 
the intuitive link between being the immedi-
ate, introspective experiencer of an event and 
the impossibility of failing to identify oneself 
as such.  
Finally, notice that immunity to error 
through misidentification does not mean in-
fallibility. When you make a claim that a is F 
and your claim is immune to error through 
misidentification,  
 
it is not possible for you to be right in 
thinking that something is F, but to have 
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made a mistake in figuring out which this 
it is that is F.16  
 
However, you may still be mistaken in 
thinking that something is F. 
 
█ Immunity to error through  
misidentification and control 
 
Higginbotham17 argues that the subject of 
control complements (call it PRO) is immune 
to error through misidentification (at least 
with certain predicates, such as remember, 
imagine, and want) relatively to the subject of 
the main clause, in the same way the first 
person pronoun is, when used as subject,    
relatively to the speaker.  
 Consider the following inference: 
 
(11)a. I remember someone saying that John should finish 
his thesis by July 
 b. As I am now assured, it was I who said it 
 c. I remember PRO saying John should  
  finish his thesis by July 
 
The inference is not sound: (11c) does not 
follow from (11a-b). My having acquired 
knowledge that it was me who said John 
should  finish  his  thesis by July does not 
warrant the conclusion that I remember 
saying  so.  On  the  other  hand,  notice  that 
(11a-b)  support  the  conclusion  in  (11d). 
 
(11)d. I remember myself/my saying John should  
  finish his thesis by July 
 
 The facts in (11) show that (11c) is in-
compatible  with  a  scenario where the       
bearer of the memory is in doubt about the 
identity of the person who he remembers 
said John should finish his thesis by July. In 
fact, (12a) seems contradictory, whereas 
(12b) does not.  
  
(12)a. Jim remembers saying that John should finish his 
thesis by July,  
  although, now that he thinks about it, he is not sure 
it was he who he remembers saying it. 
 b. Jim remembers himself saying that John should  
  finish his thesis by July,  
  although, now that he thinks about it, he is not sure 
it was he who he remembers saying it. 
 
It seems therefore that,  in  (11a),  Jim  ex- 
presses that fact that he has a memory such 
that he cannot be wrong in identifying the 
subject of his memory as himself. The intui-
tive reason for the contrast in (12) is that, 
when Jim remembers PRO saying something 
to John he does not remember the proposi-
tion that he did so; rather, he remembers the 
subjective experience of saying something to 
John. It is in this sense that the control com-
plement of remember is immune to error 
through misidentification relatively to the 
subject of remember.18 
The same conclusion holds for imagine. 
(13a) sounds contradictory, whereas (13b) 
does not. Again, the intuition behind this 
judgment is that (13a) reports Mary’s subjec-
tive experience of flying through space, 
which, as such, is immune to the possibility 
of misidentifying its experiencer, whereas 
(13b) is also compatible with Mary’s imagi-
ning an individual, whom she identifies with 
herself, flying through space.  
 
(13)a. Mary imagined flying through space,  
  although she is not sure it was she who she  
  imagined flying  
    b. Mary imagined herself flying through space,  
  although she is not sure it was she who she  
  imagined flying  
 
It is important to observe that PRO con-
trasts with the first person pronoun in that it 
is always immune to error through misidenti-
fication. Remember that I is immune to error 
only when used as subject, but not when used 
as object. PRO, on the other hand, is always 
immune to error through misidentification, 
independently of the nature of the predicate 
of which it is an argument. For example, PRO 
is immune to error both in (14a), where it is 
the subject of the predicate being in love, and 
(14b), where it is the subject of the passive 
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predicate being kissed by Mary. Moreover, 
both sentences are naturally interpreted as 
reports of John’s subjective memory or    
imagination of the experiences of being in 
love with Mary or being kissed by Mary. 
 
(14)a. John remembers/imagined PRO being in love with 
Mary 
     b. John remembers/imagined PRO being kissed by 
 Mary 
 
There are, in fact, two properties of the 
control complements under discussion that 
we want to make explicit: (i) PRO is always 
interpreted as the object of an implicit de se 
thought, in the sense of Recanati,19 to be de-
fined below; (ii) the immunity to error 
through misidentification of PRO is not ba-
sis-relative, in the sense of Morgan,20 which 
we will explain below. 
Recanati distinguishes two types of de se 
belief: explicit de se, a type of belief about  
oneself that is not immune to error through 
misidentification, and implicit de se, a type of 
belief about oneself that is necessarily immu-
ne to error through misidentification. If we 
adopt the distinction proposed by Recanati, 
we can describe the control complements 
under discussion as unambiguous cases of 
implicit de se.  
Morgan individuates basis-relativity as a 
fundamental property of immunity to error 
through misidentification relative to the first-
person. Whether a first-person sentence, 
thought, judgment, or belief is immune to er-
ror through misidentification, depends on 
the basis on which it is made: 
 
There are different bases on which I 
might judge “I hear trumpets”. For ex-
ample, I might base that judgment on an 
auditory perception I am having. If I do, 
the judgment seems to be fp-immune [i.e. 
immune to error through misidentifica-
tion relative to the first person; D&F]. But 
what if I had made the same judg-ment on 
the basis of an inference from the fol-
lowing judgments: “The person in the 
third row hears trumpets” and “I am the 
person in the third row” (we can imagine 
that I have come to know both of these 
premises through testimony)? At least 
when made on this kind of inferential ba-
sis my judgment “I hear trumpets” does 
not seem fp-immune. If the first premise 
of the inference had been true, but the  
second premise had been false, the error I 
made would have been an error through 
misidentification.21 
 
Morgan’s observation does not apply to 
the control cases under discussion. These 
complements are, in fact, necessarily immune 
to error through misidentification. In an intui-
tive sense, on which we will elaborate later, 
these complements provide information 
about the basis itself, by expressing the intro-
spective, subjective nature of the reported 
experience. If John remembers PRO hearing 
trumpets, he must remember the experience 
of directly perceiving trumpets, an experi-
ence which is necessarily immune to error 
through misidentification.  
 
█ Higginbotham’s account of control 
 
Higginbotham22 proposes that PRO 
stands in an anaphoric dependency with the 
subject of the matrix predicate to the effect 
that PRO is interpreted as the experiencer in 
the event designated by the matrix predicate. 
To see this, consider the example in (15a). 
The truth-conditions proposed by Higgin-
botham are as in (15b).  
 
(15)a. John imagined PRO flying through space 
 b. e(Imagine(e,John,^e’(Flying-throughspace 
(e’,Exp(e)))) 
 
The complement of imagined, as analyzed 
in (15b), is an intensional property of events 
of flying through space such that the subject 
of the flying is the experiencer in the event of 
imagining. According to Higginbotham’s 
analysis «the peculiar semantic contribution 
of PRO [is] that it presents the subject as the 
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subject (or experiencer) of the event or state e 
as given in the higher clause».23 That is, ac-
cording to (15b), John is imagining that the 
experiencer of the imagining itself is flying 
through space.  
Higginbotham’s analysis maintains that a 
de se belief is a special case of reflexive belief, 
where the subject of belief itself is a con-
stituent of the thought believed.24A reflexive 
thought so conceived is immune to error 
through misidentification: John cannot im-
agine that the experiencer of the imagining is 
flying through space while failing to identify 
the experiencer of the imagining with him-
self. In fact, according to Higginbotham, it is 
implausible that a person x could be in a state 
e of imagining being F without recognizing 
that x is the experiencer of e, that is, the sub-
ject of the property of events being imagined. 
If that were the case, we would have to con-
clude that x has thoughts of which x does not 
seem to himself to be the author.25 
Before evaluating Higginbotham’s propo-
sal in more detail, there is one aspect of (15b) 
that needs clarification. Higginbotham 
follows Davidson26 in constructing events as 
individual objects. Events may have partici-
pants and these participants are essential to 
the event in which they participate. Here, we 
interpret Higginbotham’s notion of thema-
tic-roles in the sense of Parsons,27 that is, as 
functions mapping events onto individuals. 
Accordingly we take the term Exp(e) to de-
note the individual who is the experiencer in 
the event e. Given Higginbotham’s as-
sumption that participants are essential to 
the event in which they participate, Exp(e) 
must denote the same individual in every 
possible world in which it denotes something. 
It follows from (15b) that the identity Exp(e) 
= John is a metaphysical necessity. For the 
same reason, (15b) is necessarily equivalent 
to (15c): 
 
(15)c. e(Imagine(e,John,^e(Flying-through  
  space(e,John)))) 
 
(15c), however, is at best a  representation 
of a de re imagining that John entertains 
about himself. As such, (15c) does not re-
present a thought that is immune to error 
through misidentification. How, then, is the 
difference between (15b) and (15c) to be 
characterized? Higginbotham28 devises two 
potential solutions to this problem. The first 
is to depart from the individuation of propo-
sitions as sets of possible worlds. Under this 
view, the properties ^e’(Flying-through-
space(e’,John) and ^e’(Flying-through-
space(e’,Exp(e)) have equivalent intensions 
but do not necessarily represent the same 
thought. This is because John and Exp(e) are 
two different concepts of the same individual. 
The second solution maintains a modal indi-
viduation of propositions but admits possible 
worlds that are not metaphysically possible. 
In those possible worlds John and Exp(e) may 
not be identical. In this way, the identity 
between (15b) and (15c) is a metaphysical 
necessity but not a necessity relatively to 
other modal bases.29 In the remainder of this 
article, we will mainly adopt the second solu-
tion when discussing and criticizing Hig-
ginbotham’s proposal. The reason is that 
Higginbotham does not offer a sufficiently 
explicit account of what he has in mind when 
distinguishing between an individual and a 
concept in a non-modal framework. There-
fore, we are not able to offer a sufficiently 
explicit criticism of Higginbotham’s proposal 
when considering this version of his hy-
pothesis.  
 
█ Against Higginbotham’s account of  
control 
 
We find Higginbotham’s proposal intuiti-
ve. In particular, we find it intuitive to con-
ceive of PRO as the experiencer in the event 
denoted by the matrix predicate. When, for 
example, I imagine flying through space, I 
imagine the experiencer of the imagining fly-
ing through space. This analysis seems to ac-
count quite naturally for the introspective 
nature of the reported attitude as well as for 
the   immunity  of  these  structures  to  errors  
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due to misidentification.  
Our objection to Higginbotham’s account 
of control is that it represents the meaning of 
control clauses as (intensional) sets of events 
that are ultimately individuated as satisfying 
a singular proposition, that is, the attribution 
of a property to an individual, whereas intro-
spective, first-personal experience cannot be 
represented as such. It is for this reason, we 
argue, that Higginbotham’s account does not 
succeed in guaranteeing immunity to error 
through misidentification.  
Consider again (15a) and its truthcon-
ditions in (15b). According to (15b), the ob-
ject of John’s imagination is the (intensional) 
set of events e’ such that the individual iden-
tified as the experiencer of e, satisfies the 
property of being flying through space. Such 
thought is based on the identification of an 
individual and the attribution of a property 
to it. As such, it is not “identification-free” 
and, therefore, not immune to error through 
misidentification.  
A fundamental observation, attributed to 
Shoemaker,30 is that the cases of self-
reference that are immune to error through 
misidentification involve reference “without 
identification”: one can be aware of an object 
as oneself without identifying it as oneself via 
properties that one ascribes to the object. As 
Shoemaker puts it:  
 
My use of the word “I” [in statements 
such as “I feel pain” or “I see a canary”] is 
not due to my having identified as myself 
something of which I know, or believe, or 
wish to say, that the predicate of my 
statement applies to it.31 
 
And in another place: 
 
In introspective self-knowledge there is 
no room for an identification of oneself, 
and no need for information on which to 
base such an identification […] There are 
indeed cases of genuine perceptual know-
ledge in which awareness of oneself pro-
vides identification information, as when 
noting the features of the man I see in the 
mirror or on the television monitor tells 
me that he is myself. But there is no such 
role for awareness of oneself as an object 
to play in explaining my introspective 
knowledge that I am hungry, angry, or 
alarmed. This comes out in the fact that 
there is no possibility here of a misidenti-
fication; if I have my usual access to my 
hunger, there is no room for the thought 
Someone is hungry all right, but is it me?32 
 
The  type  of  belief  evoked  by  sentences 
such as “I feel pain” or “I see a canary” seems 
to be “identification-free”, using a term in-
troduced by Evans. Here, by identification-
free belief we mean, following Pryor,33 a be-
lief which can be justified even though the 
subject did not base the belief on any identity 
assumptions: the subject believes of a that it 
is F even though he went through no process 
of identifying a as the thing he might know or 
believe be F. Whereas it can be disputed  
whether all identity-free beliefs are immune 
to error through misidentification,34 it is clear 
that all non-identity free beliefs are vulnera-
ble to misidentification: 
 
the identification of a presented object as 
oneself would have to go together with 
the possibility of misidentification, and it 
is precisely the absence of this possibility 
that characterizes the use of “I” that con-
cerns us [i.e. the uses of I as subject; 
D&F].35 
  
To strengthen this observation, Casta-
ñeda, Shoemaker, and Perry produced con-
vincing arguments that: «no matter how de-
tailed a token-reflexive description is, […] it 
cannot possibly entail that I am that per-
son».36 For example, Perry asks us to consi-
der the case of the amnesiac Rudolf Lingens 
who is lost in Stanford library:  
 
He reads a number of things in the libra-
ry, including a biography of himself, and a 
detailed account of the library in which he 
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is lost. He believes any Fregean thought 
you think might help him. He still won’t 
know who he is, and where he is, no mat-
ter how much knowledge he piles up.37 
 
The denotation proposed by Higginbo-
tham in (15b) presents a relation between an 
agent, John, and an (intensional) property of 
events (which we take to be a function from 
possible worlds onto sets of events), which is 
defined as the set of events e´ such that the 
individual x who satisfies the property of 
being the experiencer of the imagining, also 
satisfies the property of being flying through 
space in e´.  
Therefore, the object of John’s imagina-
tion is based on the attribution of a property, 
flying through space, to an individual, who is 
identified on the basis of the property of 
being the experiencer of the imaging. This 
way of representing John’s imagination con-
trasts sharply with the observa-tions made 
above as it entails that John is conceiving the 
person flying as an individual who is identi-
fied on the basis of a given property. As stres-
sed by Castañeda, Perry, and Shoemaker, no 
matter how detailed a description is, it can-
not possibly entail that I am the person       
satisfying it. The property of being the expe-
riencer of a certain event is no exception._ 
These considerations become crucial 
when considering a modal framework in 
which the equivalence between (15b) and 
(15c) is granted metaphysically but is not a 
necessity relatively to other modal bases. In 
fact, if John’s imagination worlds are allowed 
to include worlds where Exp(e) and John are 
not equivalent, there is no reason left to 
maintain that the reflexive nature of the     
reported imagination guarantees immunity 
to error through misidentification. The fact 
that John has an imagination about the expe-
riencer of the imagining does not guarantee 
that he is individuating that individual as 
himself. _ 
We think that the problem with Higgin-
botham’s account stems from treating the 
term Exp(e) as an individual term, des-
ignating an individual on the basis of the 
property of being the experiencer of a given 
event e. As Castañeda, Perry, Shoemaker, 
and others have taught us, an introspective, 
first-personal experience that is immune to 
error through misidentification cannot be 
represented as the attribution of a property 
to an individual identified on the basis of 
some other property. In this contribution, we 
propose to amend Higginbotham’s account 
by suggesting that the thematic role of expe-
riencer does not map an event onto an indi-
vidual; rather, it maps an event into a mini-
mal-self, in the sense of Gallagher.38 Before 
putting forward our proposal, we discuss an 
alternative account of de se belief, which is 
based on the use of centered possible worlds 
and acquaintance relations.  
 
█ Centered possible worlds and  
acquaintance relations 
 
In this section, we discuss an alternative 
account of de se belief, which is based on the 
use of centered possible worlds and ac-
quaintance relations. Hintikka39 proposes a 
simple framework for the representation of 
beliefs based on the notion of doxastic alter-
native. Let a be an intentional agent and w a 
possible world. Let Bel(a,w) be the set of pos-
sible worlds w’ such that a, on the basis of the 
knowledge she has,has no reason to exclude 
w’ as a candidate for being the actual world. 
Let us call Bel(a,w) the set of doxastic alter-
natives that a has in w. Then, we can say that 
a believes a proposition p iff a’s doxastic al-
ternatives entail p, that is, iff Bel(a,w) p. On 
the basis of these assumptions, a belief report 
such as (16a) is taken to denote a relation 
between a subject, Ralph, and a propo-sition, 
p, which is satisfied in w iff Ralph’s doxastic 
alternatives in w entail the proposition p: 
 
(16)a. Jim believes that p 
 b. Bel(j,w)  p 
 
As is well known, Hintikka’s semantics  of 
belief   reports  does  not  offer  a  satisfactory 
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account of de re and de se reports. Here we 
discuss the problem with de se reports. Con-
sider sentence (17a). Hintikka’s account as-
signs to (17a) the truth conditions in (17b), 
which are verified iff Jim’s doxastic alterna 
tives entail the proposition that Jim won the 
lottery. 
 
(17)a. Jim believes that he himself won the lottery 
 b. Bel(j,w)  Won-the-lottery(j) 
 
The truth-conditions in (17b) are not    
satisfactory because they are verified inde-
pendently of whether Jim is aware or not  
aware of the identity between himself and 
the object of his belief. Lewis40 attributes the 
inadequacy of Hintikka’s account to the fact 
that it treats belief as a relation between a 
subject and a proposition, where propositions 
do not have sufficient structure to represent 
the indexical, first-personal nature of some 
thoughts. Therefore, he proposes to change 
the object of belief from propositions to  
properties. Roughly, (17a) is true in Lewis’ 
account iff Jim ascribes to himself the property 
of having won the lottery.  
We now offer a formal implementation of 
Lewis’ proposal based on Cresswell and von 
Stechow.41 First, within the framework of 
Lewis’ modal realism, no entity can live in 
more than one possible world. An entity can 
have counterparts in different possible      
worlds, which are similar but not identical. 
Within this framework, properties can be  
regarded as functions from worlds onto enti-
ties, or equivalently, as sets of ordered world-
individual pairs, w, a. Let us call any pair     
w, a a centered possible world, adopting the 
terminology of Quine.42  
We can now redefine both the notion of 
doxastic alternative and the truth conditions 
of de se belief reports on the basis of the no-
tion of centered possible world. Firstly, a cen-
tered possible world w, b is a doxastic al-
ternative for a in w if a’s belief state does not 
rule out the possibility that a is the individual 
b living in world w. Let us refer to a’s          
doxastic alternatives in w as Lewis-doxastic 
alternatives, or BelL (a, w). Secondly, a be-
lieves de se that , where  is a set of         
centered possible worlds, iff a’s doxastic     
alternatives entail , that is, iff BelL(a, w). 
Higginbotham objects to Lewis’s proposal 
by pointing out that centered possible worlds 
are insufficient to distinguish between beliefs 
de se and beliefs dere. We review Higgin-
botham’s  argument by considering  the fol-
lowing scenario:  
 
Suppose I [J. Higginbotham] believe (in 
world @, say) that somebody has won the 
lottery, but I don’t believe it is me (my-
self). The result has been announced by 
ticket number, and I therefore believe 
that the person with ticket 47 has won the 
lottery, but I don’t have an opinion as 
whether I myself am the person with       
ticket 47. Then (as is said in these sce-
narios) you, commenting on me, can     
defend the statement that H has an o-
pinion as to who has won the lottery, be-
cause H knows that the person with ticket 
47 has won, and you know that he is that 
person.43 
 
Consider a model D,W where D, the 
domain of quantification, includes two indi-
viduals, H and B, and W includes the four 
possible worlds, @, w, w’, and w’’ described in 
(18). 
 
(18) a. @  | H wins, H holds ticket 47,B holds ticket 45 
 b. w  | B wins, H holds ticket 45,B holds ticket 47 
 c. w’  | H wins, H holds ticket 45,B holds ticket 47 
 d. w’’  | B wins, H holds ticket 47,B holds ticket 45 
 
Accordingly, the domain of centered  pos-
sible worlds corresponds to the product D 
W: 
 
(19)a. H, @ 
 b. H, w 
 c. H, w’ 
 d. H, w’’ 
 e. B, @ 
 f. B, w 
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 g. B, w’ 
 h. B, w’’ 
 
In the scenario described by Higgin-
botham, H’s doxastic alternatives are the 
possible worlds (19a) and (19b). (19c-d) and 
(19g-h) are excluded from H’s alternatives, 
because in those worlds the holder of ticket 
45 wins. (19e-f) must also be excluded be-
cause H knows that HB. When H realizes 
that he himself is the owner of ticket 47 he 
further excludes (19b) from his doxastic     
alternatives, because in w it is B who owns 
ticket 47. In short 
 
the proposal is that by taking the product 
DW of agents and worlds we can specify 
the first-personal nature of some of our 
beliefs, whilst allowing that we may have 
beliefs about ourselves that  are  not  
firstpersonal.44 
 
Higginbotham’s objection to this picture 
is that it does not capture the nature of the de 
re report H believes that he has won the lot-
tery. Notice that in (19b) H does not win the 
lottery. Therefore, the centered worlds (19a) 
and (19b) are bound to be the objects of a  
belief about the description the owner of     
ticket 47. That is, they represent, at best, the 
object of a de dicto belief that H has about the 
description the owner of ticket 47, and cannot 
be the object of a belief about a specific res. 
Notice that, in Higginbotham’s scenario, 
this conclusion is actually sound. In effect, at 
the stage in which H has been informed that 
the winner is the holder of ticket 47 but is 
still not aware that he himself holds that     
ticket, H seems to be entertaining a de dicto 
belief that the owner of ticket47, whoever that 
is, has won the lottery. At that stage, H does 
not seem to have a particular res in mind 
which is the object of his belief. Therefore, it 
seems also correct to assume that (19a) and 
(19b) offer a satisfactory representation of 
H’s belief in the present scenario.  
Notice,  furthermore,   that   the   scenario 
considered  by  Higginbotham  is  actually in- 
compatible with the statement H believes that 
he has won the lottery, whereas it is compa-
tible with the statement H believes that the 
holder of ticket 47 won the lottery, where the 
pronoun is replaced with a definite descrip-
tion.  
It is still possible, however, to construct a 
scenario in which H has a de re belief about 
himself without being aware that the object 
of his belief is he himself. Suppose that H is 
waiting to find out who won the lottery and, 
as above, does not know the number of his 
own ticket. Suppose furthermore that, for 
some reason, H has formed the belief that the 
man sitting at the opposite end of the room is 
the winner, unaware of the fact that that man 
is H himself reflected in a mirror. At this sta-
ge, H’s belief is represented by (19a) and 
(19c), that is, by those possible worlds that 
are centered on H where H wins.  
Suppose now that, once the winner has 
been announced, H believes that the winner 
is the owner of ticket 47. This belief excludes 
(19c) from the centered possible worlds ac-
cessible to H, because in (19c) the winner is 
the owner of ticket 45. In conclusion, the on-
ly centered possible world accessible to H is 
(19a) even though, at this stage, H is not   
aware that the res he believes to be the owner 
of ticket 47 and the winner of the lottery are 
both himself. We believe this example offers 
better support to Higginbotham’s conclusion 
that the use of centered possible worlds does 
not capture the de re nature of de se reports.45 
Higginbotham discusses the possibility of 
using acquaintance relations to “rebuild” de 
re beliefs within the framework of centered 
possible worlds but eventually dismisses it: 
 
in Postscript A to [Attitudes De Dicto and 
De Se] Lewis endeavors to build the per-
ceptual de re back into the picture, via ac-
quaintance relations. However, even 
apart from the question what such rela-
tions are (they involve ascribing pro-
perties to one’s own perceptual system, of 
thinking of oneself as looking or staring 
at, for example, and in this sense they are 
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conceptually sophisticated; they are also 
necessarily self-conscious, inasmuch as 
they involve the self-ascription of per-
ceptual properties), talk of de re belief 
remains on Lewis’s extended view a man-
ner of  speaking, since it is not a (purely or 
narrowly) psychological state in his      
sense.46 
 
Nevertheless, we wish to stress that, if we 
leave aside the type of objection raised by 
Higginbotham, acquaintance relations do 
succeed in providing a satisfactory rendering 
of de re belief which distinguishes it from de 
se belief. Furthermore, the use of acquaintan-
ce relations solves the so-called double vision 
puzzles originally pointed out by Quine.47 
Cresswell and von Stechow48 were the first to 
propose a generalized account of attitudes de 
re and de se based on the use of both Lewis’ 
centered possible worlds and Kaplan’s49     
notion of acquaintance relations.  
More recently, Maier50 has advocated an 
explanation of de re and de se belief based on 
the use of acquaintance relations within the 
framework of Discourse Representation Theo-
ry. In what follows, we present the main fea-
tures of the truth-conditions assigned to de re 
and de se beliefs by a framework based on ac-
quaintance relations: an agent a believes de re 
of b that P iff the following three conditions 
are met: 
 
(20)a. R is a contextually relevant acquaintance relation; 
 b. R relates the agent of the belief a with the resb; 
 c. BelL(a, w) {w, x: y is the object x is related 
   to by R and P(y) is true in w}.51 
 
As anticipated, an advantage of this anal-
ysis is that it accounts for the so-called dou-
ble vision puzzles, such as Quine’s famous 
Ortcutt’s example.52 In short, the analysis al-
lows that a subject has contradictory beliefs 
about a certain res as long as those beliefs are 
entertained under different acquaintance   
relations toward the res. Ralph may think 
that Ortcutt is a spy under the acquaintance 
relation “seen (by Ralph) in a brown hat in 
occasion 1” and at the same time think that 
Ortcutt is not a spy under the acquaintance 
relation “seen (by Ralph) in a green hat in oc- 
casion 2”.  
In this framework a de se belief is a special 
kind of de re belief where the acquaintance 
relation is one of self-identification. When 
Hhas a de re belief about the winner of the 
lottery, he believes that the individual he is 
acquainted with as “man sitting at the other 
hand of the room” is the winner. When H has 
a de se belief, he believes that the man he is 
acquainted with as the subject that is identi-
cal to himself is the winner. Therefore, cen-
tered possible worlds can successfully ac-
count for both de re and de se belief reports 
when combined with the use of acquaintance 
relations. _ 
A more cogent objection to this type of 
analysis (which Maier is well-aware of)53 is 
that it cannot account for those reports that 
are unambiguously de se. The choice of what 
is the relevant acquaintance relation to be 
used when interpreting a de re report is       
determined by the context of utterance and 
not by grammatical features of the report. 
How is it then possible that natural languages 
display a range of grammatical means to un-
ambiguously report a de se belief?  
This, we submit, is a cogent empirical 
problem that undermines the use of ac-
quaintance relations to represent de re and de 
se belief and might ultimately support      
Higginbotham’s account, which seems better 
suited for the cases of grammatical encoding 
of de se. 
On top of these objections, we would like 
to stress here that a framework based on    
acquaintance relations cannot explain the 
semantic properties of the control comple-
ments we are considering in this article. The 
reasons supporting these conclusions are the 
same as those we presented against Higgin-
botham’s proposal:54 ultimately, the object of 
a belief is necessarily represented as the at-
tribution of a property to an individual that 
is identified on the basis of  a  certain  pro-
perty, in this case an acquaintance relation.  
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This is clear in (20c): the object of x’s be-
lief is the individual y such that x is related to 
y by means of the acquaintance relation R. 
For the same reason that there is no property 
whatsoever that entails that I am the indivi-
dual bearing that property, so there is no ac-
quaintance relation that necessarily entails 
that I am the individual I am acquainted 
with, therefore deriving immunity to error 
through misidentification.55 
 
█ Experiencers as bridges to “minimal-self” 
 
Acquaintance relations (in the sense dis-
cussed above) lend themselves to an im-
portant extension.  Consider the following 
reflexive sentences in English and Dutch, 
respectively: 
 
(21)a. Bill admired himself 
 b. Bill bewonderde zichzelf 
 
Clearly, the same  kind  of  ambiguity  can 
be detected as in the cases of de re/ de se am-
biguity detected in the complements of verbs 
of propositional attitudes.56 To briefly il-
lustrate this, consider the scenario in which 
Bill is watching a man on TV who is bravely 
rescuing a boy whose life is endangered. Bill 
admires the man, without realizing that what 
he is presently seeing are the recorded images 
of something he did years before. As for the 
cases of de re reviewed above, an external ob-
server is allowed to describe this situation, in 
English, by making use of (21a).  
The reason for this is arguably the fol-
lowing: though the rescuing person is 
certainly Bill (coreference is induced by the 
use of the reflexive pronoun, under standard 
assumptions), nothing prevents Bill from ac-
cessing the res he is admiring in terms of an 
acquaintance relation (say, “the man who is 
bravely rescuing the boy”), in terms that are 
pretty much compatible with Bill’s una-
wareness that the res is  Bill  himself.  The 
same holds for the standard reading assigned 
to (21a), which we may identify with a de se 
reading: Bill admires himself, in the full     
awareness that the person whom he admires 
is he himself.  
In  this  case,  we   can   obviously  propose 
that the res Bill is admiring is accessed by Bill 
as “identical to Bill”: in other words, “identi-
ty” is the salient acquaintance relation, as in 
Maier’s terms. At first sight, these considera-
tions seem to lend further support to the 
pragmatic approach, since the de re / de se 
ambiguity seems connected to the interven-
tion of a contextually salient “acquaintance 
relation” in the pragmatics, independently of 
the grammatical structure used to encode the 
relevant proposition. There is also an im-
portant empirical advantage, since de se / de 
re ambiguities are correctly predicted to arise 
whenever a conscious subject can be con-
ceived of as accessing a res by means of some 
contextually relevant acquaintance relation. 
Reflexive structures are thus a nice example 
of this kind of extension.57 
However, this picture is not really sat-
isfying, for the same reason envisaged in the 
discussion above: grammar is capable of   
getting rid of the ambiguity, contrary to what 
we should expect if acquaintance relations 
are the only relevant factor for the ambiguity. 
In the case of reflexive structures, the pro-
blem arises with so-called “lexical” reflexives, 
exemplified, for English and Dutch, in (22a-
b) below, respectively: 
 
(22)a. Bill washed / shaved 
 b. Bill waste /schoor zich 
 
For the sentences in (22), it is quite 
tempting to propose that they can be given 
only a de se reading. Prima facie, it sounds 
contradictory to say “Bill washed without  
realizing that the person he washed was he 
himself”. Interestingly, this observation      
extends to verbs with incorporated reflexives 
(En. self-admire, It. autoeleggersi “self-elect”). 
To see this, it suffices to consider that one 
can apparently say, without being contradic-
tory, things like “Bill admired himself on TV 
without realizing that the person he was   
admiring was he himself”, as already em-
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phasized above, whereas it clearly sounds 
contradictory to say things like “Bill engaged 
in a mental process of self-admiration       
without realizing that the person he was   
admiring was he himself”. Why should lexical 
reflexives be unambiguous? More exactly, 
why do they necessarily trigger a de se inter-
pretation?  
Here is a possible line of explanation,    
based on seminal observations by T. Rein-
hart and much successive work.58 Lexical   
reflexive structures are structures in which a 
unique argument has to be assigned more 
than one theta-role (we disregard here the 
syntactic reasons why this happens). The two 
theta-roles that are assigned to the unique 
argument (for instance, to “Bill” in (22)) are 
first “bundled” together in the lexicon:   
roughly we form, starting from the theta-role 
of agent and the theta-role of patient associa-
ted with the verb “wassen” “to wash”, a com-
plex theta-role “AgentPatient”, and then 
we assign this complex theta-role to the      
argument “Bill”.  
The interpretive effect of this lexi-
cal/syntactic procedure comes quite close to 
the “reflexive” reading that Higginbotham 
associates with de se, as extensively discussed 
in the previous sections. Roughly, the washed 
person, that is, “Bill” in (22b), is also assigned 
the Agent theta-role (as an effect of bund-
ling), and this is reasonably equivalent to 
saying that the washed person is necessarily 
accessed by the conscious subject as the 
washing person. In other words, the patient 
is accessed as “identical to the agent”.  
Crucially, however, this reflexive interpre-
tation, according to which an object is essen-
tially conceptualized as non-distinct from the 
subject, is no longer merely the consequence 
of a particular sort of acquaintance relation 
(identity) induced in the pragmatics: it is 
thematic bundling, that is, a lexical process 
with syntactic implications, that enforces 
identity as the only possible acquaintance re-
lation.  
The   final   picture  would  thus  be  some-
thing along the following lines: the cognitive  
basis for the de re / de se ambiguity lies in the 
possibility of accessing a res as non-distinct 
from the subject accessing it. In some cases, 
this possibility can be grammatically en-
forced, with the effect that the ambiguity 
disappears, in the sense that the relevant 
grammatical structure can only be used with 
a de se reading, and not simply optionally 
used with a de se reading depending on the 
context of utterance, as is the case when ac-
quaintance relations are a function of the 
pragmatics. 
However, some important empirical re-
finements are in order here. Consider first 
another class of Dutch lexical reflexives, 
exemplified in (23): 
      
(23)Jan verbaasde zich 
 “John got surprised” 
 
There  are  no  scenarios  in which (23) 
could be used with a de re interpretation, to 
express, for instance, the reading according 
to which Jan surprised himself in seeing his 
own image reflected in a mirror, and without 
recognizing the image in the mirror as he 
himself. The only possible interpretation of 
(23) is one in which it is used as a report of 
the fact that Jan got surprised.  
What is reported is a past subjective ex-
perience of surprise whereby the cause of the 
surprise cannot be distinguished from the 
experiencer: the experience is immediately 
given to a self that is not identified by means 
of explicit acts of reflection or of external 
perception. If I utter a sentence like “Ik ver-
baas me” (“I am surprised”), it is thus point-
less for you to inquire whether I could be 
mistaken about the identity of the experi-
encer of the surprise, as an instance of error 
through misidentification. It makes no more 
sense for you to ask me: “Are you really sure 
that it is you who is surprised?” than it does 
when you ask: “Are you sure that it’s really 
you who is seeing a canary?” as a reaction to 
my assertive use of the sentence “I see a cana-
ry”. On these grounds, (23) can be taken to 
instantiate the subclass of de se  readings  that 
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we have identified as IEM-readings. 
From this perspective, there is a substan-
tial difference between the lexical reflexives 
exemplified in (23) and those exemplified in 
(22). As emphasized in the discussion above, 
there is certainly a strong bias to interpret 
(22) as a report on an event in which Bill 
consciously washed/shaved himself, i.e. he 
washed/shaved while being completely aware 
that the person washed/shaved was he him-
self. In spite of this, it is not difficult to figure 
out situations in which (22) can be read in 
ways that are incompatible with a strict de se 
reading.59  
For instance, suppose that Bill is found in 
the bathroom in a sleep-walking condition 
while engaging in a series of actions that we 
would undoubtedly qualify as shaving. In this 
scenario, we are allowed to report the situa-
tion, both in English and Dutch, by using 
sentences containing a lexical reflexive. We 
might say, for instance: “I entered the 
bathroom and I saw Bill shaving”, whereas it 
is quite likely, in the sleep-walking scenario, 
that Bill was not acting consciously, i.e. he 
was probably not aware, among other things, 
that the person shaved was he himself. What 
thus do (22) and (23) really have in common?  
The correct generalization seems to be 
that in the structures involving lexical refle-
xives there are strong reasons (say, on general 
cognitive grounds) to identify one of the two 
arguments of the predicate as “referentially 
non-distinguishable” from the other. In the 
case of “zich verbazen” in (23), there are no 
reasons to distinguish between the “expe-
riencer” argument and the “cause” argument, 
since what we are reporting is an immedia-
tely given subjective experience.  
In the case of “zich wassen/scharen” in 
(22), what is described is a state of affairs in 
which the Agent automatically performs a 
well-defined series of actions (including     
internal motor control instructions) automa-
tically affecting some of his body parts (simi-
lar considerations hold for “zich ontkleden” 
(to get undressed), etc.).  
In this case, it is thus not required that the 
Agent be aware that she is non-distinct from 
the Patient, it is only required that the agent 
be involved in an automatically developing 
course of actions whereby there is no sensible 
distinction to be made between the Agent 
and the Patient, in the sense that the indivi-
dual washed/shaved cannot possibly be diffe-
rent from the individual who performs the 
given course of actions.  
As is well-known from the literature on 
lexical reflexives, proxy-readings are comple-
tely excluded, whereas they are allowed for 
the variants involving self-reflexives. In a 
wax-museum scenario, in which John is mo-
ving, washing, shaving his wax-counterpart, 
we cannot report this situation by means of 
the sentence “John beweegt/wast/scheert 
zich”, whilst it is perfectly acceptable to 
describe it by means of the sentence “Jan be-
weegt/wast/scheert zichzelf”.  
Arguably, proxy-readings do not satisfy 
the crucial requirement for theta-bundling, 
that is, the condition according to which 
bundling is enforced by UG between two 
given theta-roles when these two theta-roles 
cannot be possibly be assigned “distinct”    
referential indexes. The statue of John goes 
proxy for John and it is not exactly John. In 
fact, the sort of movements required from 
John when he washes his wax-counterpart 
(including the internal motor control instruc-
tions) are quite different from the move-
ments (again, crucially including the internal 
motor control instructions) that result in 
“John washing”.  
On these grounds, we propose that the 
data on lexical reflexives argue for the hypo-
thesis according to which theta-bundling is 
automatically activated, on UG grounds, 
whenever two theta-roles are “referentially 
indistinguishable”. This can result in de se 
readings displaying IEM-effects (when an 
Experiencer role is involved) or in readings 
where the IEM-effects are separated from de 
se effects, as is the case for “zich bewe-
gen/wassen/scheren”. If I truly utter the sen-
tence “I shaved”, it cannot be the case that I 
was mistaken in identifying  the  shavee  with 




The reason is that if the shavee is not me 
but another person, it necessarily follows that 
I miscategorized the whole shaving event 
(since, as argued above, the event of “sha-
ving” is distinct from the event of “shaving 
someone”, including the event of “shaving 
himself”, that readily allows a proxy-reading).  
In all cases, theta-bundling is dictated by 
metaphysical necessity, i. e. by the impossibi-
lity that the theta-roles involved be distin-
guished referentially. However, de se effects 
manifest themselves only when an Expe-
riencer theta-role is involved, and gives rise 
to reports on subjective experiences. As a 
conclusion, a sufficiently fine-grained ana-
lysis of lexical reflexives suggests that theta-
bundling is strictly connected to “referential 
indistinguishability”. It may, but need not, 
give rise to “grammaticalized de se”. 
On these grounds, let us go back to con-
trol structures. We have seen above that sen-
tences like (4a), repeated here as (24), report 
the remembered event of going to the movies 
from the  first-personal  perspective  of the 
subject,  i.e. they report the subject’s expe-
rience of going to the movies: 
 
(24)John remembers PRO going to the movies 
 
We have already emphasized that it is this 
sort of obligatory “implicit de se” (Recanati) 
or, in Shoemaker’s sense, the fact that the ac-
cess to the self is immediate and non-
observational, i.e. independent of any per-
ceptual or reflective act of consciousness, 
that makes control structures of the type in 
(24) paradigmatic instances of “immunity to 
error through misidentification”. It is also 
well-known that instances of obligatory con-
trol (OC) such as (24) are incompatible with 
a de re reading, whereas the structures 
exemplifying non-obligatory control (NOC) 
can be interpreted de re.60 A relevant minimal 
pair is offered in (25):61 
 
(25)a. The crow remembered  PRO being stupid  
  (OC; de se reading only) 
     b. The crow said that  PRO singing that song was
 stupid  
  (NOC; ambiguous between a de re and a de se  
  reading) 
The question obviously arises why OC 
triggers unambiguous de se and immunity to 
error through misidentification (IEM). The 
answer that naturally suggests itself is that 
OC might simply be another case of thematic 
bundling: the internal theta-role (the one 
traditionally associated with PRO in the syn-
tactic literature) is “bundled” with the main 
clause subject theta-role. Compulsory de se 
immediately follows. In (24), for instance, the 
individual going to the movies (or, more 
exactly, in the present terms, the individual 
who experiences going to the movies) is ne-
cessarily accessed as the experiencer of the 
remembering, as a direct consequence of 
thematic bundling. Identity is thus gramma-
tically enforced as the only legitimate ac-
quaintance relation, and de se is the only 
available interpretive option.62_ 
However, this is only a partial answer to 
the question we have raised. It is in fact still 
not entirely clear why thematic bundling 
should enforce, besides compulsory de se, also 
IEM-effects, as is actually the case with obli-
gatory control structures. In (24) thematic 
bundling has the effect that the object of 
John’s remembering is represented as the at-
tribution of a property (i.e. the property of 
experiencing going to the movies) to an indi-
vidual who is identified as the experiencer of 
the remembering. However, as stressed by an 
influential philosophical tradition to which 
we adhere (Castañeda, Perry, and Shoema-
ker), no matter how detailed a description is, 
it cannot possibly entail that I am the person 
satisfying it.  
As already emphasized above, being the 
experiencer in a certain event should be no 
exception. Or, in slightly different terms, 
identifying two individuals who are the ex-
periencers in two different events should not 
lead to that kind of immediate, non-
observational access to the self that is 
responsible, according to Shoemaker, for the 
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IEM-effects. What is then the source of IEM 
for sentences like (24) and (25a)? Clearly, 
something is still missing. 
We believe that the  solution to this  prob-
lem simply consists in considering another 
problem that has not been made explicit, so 
far. Namely, we proposed, based on our di-
scussion of lexical reflexives, that thematic 
bundling typically involves theta-roles sha-
ring the “experience” feature. But why should 
this be the case? A way of tying up these    
loose ends consists in exploring the possibi-
lity that they are intimately connected. It 
might be the case that thematic bundling is 
particularly sensitive to the Experiencer the-
ta-role because the latter is different from the 
other theta-roles. And it might be the case 
that this difference is the source of the IEM-
effects triggered by thematic bundling. Gal-
lagher explores the idea of a primitive 
consciousness that is still not shaped by con-
ceptual thought. This notion of “minimal 
self” is arguably linked to the senses of      
ownership and agency triggered by motor  
action and cognition in the  models  that   
have been  developed for schizophrenia. In 
Gallagher’s terms, a minimal self is  
 
a consciousness of oneself as an immedia-
te subject of experience, unextended in 
time. The minimal self almost certainly 
depends on brain processes and an ecolo-
gically embedded body, but one does not 
have to know or be aware of this to have 
an experience that still counts as a self-
experience.63 
 
The basic insight is that we do not need 
individual-identification by means of proper-
ty ascription in order to be able to account 
for «the sense that I am the one who is cau-
sing something to move, or that I am the one 
who is generating a certain thought in my 
stream of consciousness» or for  
 
the sense that I am the one who is under-
going an experience. For example, the 
sense that my body is moving regardless 
of whether the movement is voluntary or 
involuntary.64  
 
This  notion  of  “minimal self”  has  to  be 
carefully kept apart from what Gallagher and 
other influential neuroscientists identify as 
the “narrative self”, which is conceived of as 
an object endowed with a more or less co-
herent set of properties, corresponding to the 
stories that we and others entertain about 
ourselves, based on events in the past and in 
the future.  
 Clearly, it is the first-personal concept of 
minimal self, and not the third-personal con-
cept of narrative self, that is intuitively linked 
to Shoemaker’s idea of an access to the self 
that is independent of any perceptual or re-
flective act of consciousness (an access that 
he defines as “immediate” and “non-
observational”). It is the minimal self that 
provides the source for the IEM-effects ori-
ginally detected by Wittgenstein in sentences 
such as “I am in pain” or “I am hearing the 
sound of bells”.  
In the  present  framework,  this  basic  in-
sight may be implemented by proposing that 
the Experiencer theta-role is not a function 
from events to canonical individuals, as in 
the Davidsonian tradition. It follows that 
Exp(e) is not equivalent to an individual 
term, and that the bundling of two experi-
encer theta-roles is not equivalent to identi-
fying two individuals in terms of some      
mechanism of property-ascription to these 
individuals. This is already a welcome result, 
if we want to pursue the idea that compulso-
ry de se and IEM-effects (as detected in obli-
gatory control structures) cannot be the re-
sult of some specific modality of property-
ascription to individuals, contrary to the line 
of analysis advocated by Evans and Higgin-
botham.  
Suppose all of this is essentially correct. 
What is then an Experiencer? Essentially, we 
think that “Experiencer” (as a theta-role at 
the interface between the conceptual system 
and the linguistic system) is a function that 
applies to events and delivers “minimal sel-
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ves”. This is intended to model the insight 
that there are event participants that are not 
canonical individuals (that is, objects defined 
as non-trivial set of properties).  
It goes without saying that the strength of 
the proposal depends on how minimal selves 
are modeled within the assumed semantic 
framework: What are the metaphysi-
cal/ontological properties of such objects and 
what type of semantics do they entail for the 
Experiencer theta-role? Also, how do mini-
mal selves relate to canonical individuals?  
Here, we provide a few preliminary an-
swers to these questions, while leaving a mo-
re in-depth analysis of these and strictly re-
lated issues to a future occasion. The mini-
mal self, as defined by Gallagher, is a mental 
object, an instance of res cogitans, correspon-
ding to the conscious, self-aware subject of 
experience.65  
We think that a minimal self, the subject 
of an experience, is intrinsically related to the 
event it experiences in that the subject and 
the experience are both necessary and suffi-
cient conditions of each other’s existence. An 
experience of hearing trumpets, to see an 
example, does not exist without a subject ex-
periencing the hearing; at the same time, the 
minimal self corresponding to the subject of 
the experience of hearing trumpets exists on-
ly in as much as the experience itself exists. 
The bidirectional causal relation between ex-
periencer and experience is paralleled at the 
epistemic level if we maintain that the sub-
ject of the experience and the experience it-
self are epistemically indistinguishable (a the-
sis that, according to Brooke, can already be 
found in Kant.  
Suppose for a moment that you are loo-
king at some words typed on a screen:  
 
Kant’s claim seems to be that the re-
presentation of the words on the screen is 
all the experience I need to be aware not 
just of the words and the screen but also 
of the act of seeing them and of who is 
seeing them, namely, me.66  
 
The metaphysical qualities of the minimal 
self suggest that the Experiencer theta-role is 
a directly referential rigid designator with the 
same semantic properties of other names of 
mental phenomena. As is well known, 
Kripke’s theory of reference entails that the 
claim “heat is molecular motion” is a logical 
necessity. The reason why we have an intui-
tion that the sentence represents an a posteri-
ori truth lies in the fact that the description 
that is used to “fix the reference” of the rigid 
term “heat” is such that it could fail, in some 
possible world, to identify the same reference 
as the term “molecular motion”. However, 
Kripke67 also makes a point that the same 
strategy cannot apply to names of mental 
phenomena such as “pain” and to correspon-
ding materialistic claims such as “pain is C-
fibre stimulation”. Whereas, in the case of 
“heat”, we can distinguish the manifest quali-
ties that are used to fix the reference of the 
term and the reference of the term itself, no 
such distinction is possible between the qua-
lities that are used to fix the reference of 
“pain” and pain itself:68  
 
To be in the same epistemic situation that 
would obtain if one had pain is to have a 
pain.69  
 
Names of mental phenomena are there 
fore directly referential and rigid and their 
reference is not fixed on the basis of a 
description. The Experiencer theta-role can 
be conceived of as a function from an event 
to an immediately given subjective expe-
rience, i.e. a minimal self. Reference to the 
minimal self is also direct and rigid: crucially, 
it is not fixed by means of a description.   
Minimal selves, as other mental entities, can 
be accessed exclusively by introspection. 
The peculiar status of first person Experi-
encer subjects observed by Wittgenstein 
follows straightforwardly. A truthful claim 
about an experience can be made only by the 
individual who has introspective access to 
the minimal self that is the subject of the ex-
perience. Since the access to the minimal self 
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is limited to the individual that “bears” it, 
through direct introspection and without the 
recourse to descriptive content, there cannot 
be any “error of misidentification”, though 
there can still be, of course, an error in the 
“categorization” of the subjective experience 
itself. Intuitively, the link between minimal 
selves and their “bearers” is established by 
means of inferential processes, though we 
will not discuss this in any detail here._ 
Let us briefly consider an example. Sup-
pose that someone wakes up after a long pe-
riod of unconsciousness, unable to remember 
who she is and also unable to have, in the few 
seconds following her awakening, any per-
ception of her body apart from an intense 
sense of nausea. This person might immedia-
tely think something of the sort of “I feel 
nausea”. Clearly, the experiencer in such an 
event qualifies as an optimal candidate for a 
“minimal self”, since her “subjective” partici-
pation in the event of feeling nausea is not 
dependent on any process of identifying an 
individual endowed with some non-trivial set 
of properties (apart, of course, from the pro-
perty of feeling nausea). Somewhat more ex-
plicitly, a minimal self could be defined as the 
experiencer in the class of events that are 
primitively defined as “subjective experi-
ences”.  
From this perspective, Exp(e) is not a 
canonical individual-referring expression. 
Exp(e) does not refer to an individual a 
which might or might not be endowed with 
the property P corresponding to its participa-
tion in the relevant “subjective” experience 
(i.e. to an individual a for which it might be 
the case Exp(e) = a or it might be the case 
Exp(e)  a); rather, Exp(e) refers to some-
thing that necessarily satisfies P (in the wor-
lds where P is instantiated) and is uniquely 
defined as something that satisfies P.  
Let us take stock of where we stand. In a 
nutshell, we have proposed that the mech-
anism responsible for grammatical enforce-
ment of compulsory de se and IEM-effects in 
control structures is thematic bundling. The 
reason why thematic bundling yields these 
interpretive effects is that bundling unifies 
two Experiencer theta-roles. Experiencers 
map events onto “minimal selves”.  
This elegantly accounts for the subtle in-
terpretive effects we detected in control 
structures such as (24): the object of the re-
membering is not the ascription of a property 
to an independently established individual, it 
is rather the subjective feeling of undergoing 
the perceptual experience described by the 
infinitival complement. This entails that (24) 
is to be interpreted as a report on the fact 
that the minimal self involved in the experi-
ence of remembering is identified with the 
minimal self undergoing the experience of 
going to the movie.  
Intuitively, this process of minimal-self 
unification gives rise to a more complex mi-
nimal self defined by the fact that the subjec-
tive experience of going to the movies is also 
a subjective experience of remembering. 
Cognitively, this can be seen as a first step 
towards the construction of a narrative self, 
that is, an individual to which one could 
ascribe properties as the result of a conscious 
act of reflection. However, analyzing the 
complex cognitive/linguistic interplay be-
tween minimal and narrative self largely 
exceeds the limits of the present contributi-
on, and we leave it to future work.  
Here, we are content with having sket-
ched the basic ingredients of an analysis     
according to which (i) control structures 
provide a way of encoding compulsory de se 
and immunity to error through misiden-
tification;70 and (ii) the latter crucially de-
pends on the absence of any process of indi-
vidual-identification through property-
ascription, in full compliance with some of 
the insights of an influential philosophical 
tradition, including Castañeda, Perry and 
Shoemaker.  
The present proposal is based on an ori-
ginal reinterpretation of the Experiencer the-
ta-role, to be developed and refined in future 
work. Significantly, our proposal offers good 
prospects for a combination of the results of 
the research on linguistic encoding of first-
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personal thoughts and the by now impressive 
body of neuropsychological research on the 
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out of the main clause and the embedded clause 
predicates. In a nutshell, the argument runs as 
follows: when we utter (24) we do not really want 
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membering (whose subject is John) whose con-
tent is the event consisting in John going to the 
movies. This is rather the interpretation of the 
counterpart of (24) in which “remember” takes an 
infinitival complement (and it is of course the 
correct reading of “John remembers that he has 
gone to the movies”). What (24) expresses is the 
meaning according to which John is – in a sense – 
the experiencer of an event of going to the mo-
vies, while this event is categorized – by John 
himself as its experiencer – as an event of        
“remembering”. Clearly, this interpretation is ba-
sed on some process of complex predicate forma-
tion in the semantics. Ultimately, there is thus a 
clear sense according to which theta-bundling, 
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two roles belonging to a unique complex predica-
te. 
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not compulsory.  Consider (i) in Italian: (i) Gian-
ni pensa di aver spedito,  trent’anni prima, il mes-
saggio al Presidente [Gianni thinks to have sent, 
30 years before, the message to the President]. 
The relevant observation is that we may utter (i) 
to describe a  scenario  in  which  Gianni has va-
gue memories about the relevant series of events 
that took place 30 years before, and although he 
thinks that  the  message  was sent  by him him-
self, it was  in fact one of the officials working 
with him who sent the message to the President. 
A different case is provided by cases such as (ii) 
Maria  wants  to  be  slim.  The relevant scenario 
is one on which Maria refuses to help herself to a 
biscuit and someone utters (ii). In Jaszczolt’s 
words,  «the  speaker  of (ii)  may  not even in-
tend to convey  Maria’s  wish  but merely gener-
alize  on  Maria’s  eating  habits»,  to  the effect 
that «cognitive access to oneself and PRO are not 
inseparably connected» (see K.M. JASZCZOLT, 
First-Person  Reference in Discourse: Aims and 
Strategies,   in:    «Journal   of   Pragmatics»,    vol. 
XLVIII, n. 1, 2013, pp. 57-70). We do not think 
that these examples can be taken to show that 
control can be loosely interpreted as propo-sed by 
Jaszczolt. However, we have to leave a detailed 
discussion  of  the  issues  involved  to  a future 
occasion. 
